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	 Introduction 
‘They were wrong and he was right. The obvious, the silly, and the true had got to be 
defended. Truisms are true, hold onto that! The solid world exists, its laws do not change. 
Stones are hard, water is wet, objects unsupported fall toward the earth’s centre.’

(George Orwell, 1984)

	 Cynics sometimes have it that philosophical statements are either truistic or false. In this 
paper—and perhaps in a way that would conveniently put us in the good graces of Orwell’s 
Thinkpol—we show that it is not a conceptual truth about laws that they are immutable. As 
relatively uncynical philosophers, though, we are happy to leave it as an open empirical question 
whether they do actually change once in a while. 

	 Apart from some exceptions (Poincaré 1911; Whitehead 1933; or, more recently, Balashov 
1992; Shimony 1999; Lange 2009; Tahko 2015), the well-entrenched assumption that laws of 
nature are necessarily immutable has been seldom critically put into question. Yet, besides these 
philosophers’ moral right to speculate off the beaten path, such an assumption has been 
challenged to different extents by practicing scientists (see, e.g., Dirac 1937; or, more recently, 
Smolin 2015). Though most of the time it is not perfectly clear what those scientists might exactly 
be committed to when they are claiming that laws of nature ‘change’ or ‘evolve’, the very fact that 
they happen to take this idea seriously—in spite of its controversial flavor—certainly is an 
indication that some philosophical work deserves to be done. 

	 Obviously, whether or not laws of nature can change, as well as how precisely they may 
come to do that—if they do it at all—crucially depends on what the concept of ‘law of nature’ is 
taken to refer to, that is to say, what philosophical account of lawhood one holds dear. This 
relatively bland observation renders our already delicate endeavor even more hazardous from the 
outset, given the very wide diversity of ways in which the concept of a law of nature has been 
articulated by philosophers over the last decades. The least we can say is that when it comes to 
defining what laws of nature are, philosophers are not near to reaching (the beginning of) a 
consensus. This motivates our chosen methodology: in what follows, we undertake to remain 
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somewhat neutral with respect to such a controversy by surveying three of the most popular 
theories of lawhood available and, for each of them, evaluating the extent to which they allow for 
accommodating the idea that laws of nature change. 
1
	 More precisely, here is the plan. In section 1, and as a representative of those accounts of 
lawhood which rely on the idea that the nomological source of change in a world is external to the 
entities populating that world, we explore the possibility that laws of nature change within the 
framework of Armstrong’s necessitarianism. We then turn in section 2 to dispositionalism, as the 
best available account of lawhood that considers the source of change as rather internal to 
worldly entities themselves. Finally, in section 3, we deal with Humean regularity theories that 
eschew any commitment to (natural) necessity, with a focus on the mainstream, Lewis-style ‘best 
system analysis’. In all of these frameworks, we settle on exposing the extent, as well as the 
philosophical cost, of the amendments that should be enforced in order to leave room for the 
possibility of changing laws.

	 1. Changing Laws in Governism 
	 Governism is a metaphysical conception of natural law founded on the hypothesis that 
natural entities are subjected to change; that change is enacted upon them: in other words, that 
the metaphysical source of change is in a certain sense external to the entities that are changing.  2
This external conception of change is partly grounded in the metaphysical assumption that it is 
possible to have a world with the same natural properties but different laws. In consequence, 
governism should be contrasted with positions where the metaphysical source of change is 
internal, such as dispositionalism and with positions where there are no necessary connections at 
all, such as Humeanism.

	 Such a position has been defended and developed by many philosophers. However, for 
the rest of this discussion, we will concentrate on Armstrong’s (1983) conception of natural laws, 
for it is undeniably one of the clearest attempts to develop a governist conception of natural 
 In this respect, we share the spirit of a similar endeavor undertaken by Cartwright and Merlussi (2018) relative to the 1
contingency that laws possibly allow.
 In this paper we concentrate on dynamical laws. As in physics, we suppose these are more fundamental than the non-2
dynamical laws.
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necessity.  According to Armstrong, a law of nature is essentially a relation between universals 3
that have natural properties as instances. Sentences like ‘it is a law that Fs are Gs’ should be 
understood as ‘it is physically necessary that Fs are Gs’. It should be noted that the necessity 
involved here is weaker than logical necessity but is still a necessity, nonetheless. How does this 
necessity relate universals? Armstrong argued that all laws of nature are grounded on 
necessitation relations between universals. In the case that occupies us, we would represent this 
relation as N(F,G). This relation refers to states of affairs that can be described as follows:

	 Something’s being F necessitates that the same something’s being G, in virtue of the 	 	
	 universals F and G. (Armstrong 1983, 96)

	 In this context, would it be possible for a natural law to change? Before answering, we 
have to make the question clearer. What would be an appropriate conception of change here? It 
cannot be that the laws are apparently different here from there. Time should play a role. The laws 
should dynamically change.  They should differ at different times. Moreover, we want to explore 4
two quite different possibilities: local and global change of laws. The first possibility refers to the 
case where laws could change depending of the local context, the second to the case where laws 
change in all the universe at the same time.  For example, if someone wants to argue that organic 5
systems are not completely governed by physical laws, but nevertheless do not involve the 
introduction of new properties from outside, they could mean at least two things: (a) that, each 
instance, when matter is organized in organic systems, new laws appear and govern such a 
system (local version), or (b) at one point in time, new organic laws came about and are still 
governing organic systems (global version). 

	 Trying to extend Armstrong’s framework in the context of our question, we believe there 
are two configurations that could potentially be understood as a change of laws: (1) a system 
 There are other forms of governism that seem more compatible with changing laws, for example, natural laws as 3
divine decrees or certain kinds of primitivism about laws. Since our goal is to challenge the assumption that laws 
cannot change, we decided to treat a kind of governism that is the less welcoming to changing laws, on this point see 
Hildebrand (2018).
 Of course, if one defends a static conception of change, it is maybe not a fatal flaw, even if defenders of the static 4
conception of change usually distinguish spatial and temporal difference. We also put aside all complications about 
time that could come if the general theory of relativity is true.
 This could remind the reader of the notion of ‘cosmic epochs’ discussed by Armstrong (1983).5
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subjected to a change of necessities and (2) a system changing properties, but not in the 
expected way; not under the action of an already established natural law. Let us discuss each 
possibility.

1.1. A System Subjected to a Change of Necessities 
	 Two situations, apparently involving the same properties, differ radically in their behavior. 
The simplest explanation is that they are not governed by the same laws, even if they should be 
since they exhibit the same properties. This scenario could be compatible with either the local or 
the global change conception. However, to show that this simple explanation is a genuine case is 
not easy. For example, let us imagine a situation A, that corresponds to a gas trapped in a closed 
box and a situation B, where the lid of the box is now open and the gas diffuses freely. Between A 
and B, the behavior of the gas is remarkably different, nevertheless we would not say that the 
laws have changed between A and B. The same mechanical laws are acting, but the context is 
very different. Note that we could possibly built a function that will describe the correlation 
between the kinds of behavior and the kinds of context. Still, it would be understood by most 
physicists as an accidental regularity, not a law.

	 This thought experiment shows that in order to claim that it is the laws that have changed, 
we have to be able to distinguish laws from all other contextual elements; in other words, to 
distinguish between laws and initial or boundary conditions. We have to distinguish two sources 
of change: the dynamics (the laws) from the context (the initial conditions). In the literature, this 
distinction is far from being consensual. For example, for Wigner, it is essentially an 
epistemological distinction with no clear reference in reality (Wigner 1979, chapter 1); for Earman, 
it is an unclear presupposed distinction essential to understand the role of symmetries, the major 
concept of current theoretical physics (Earman 2004). In the context of governism, the distinction 
could be understood to be that laws are about necessitation connections between universals, 
whereas initial conditions are about all other accidental aspects. Unfortunately, this metaphysical 
distinction does not provide us with a useful practical criterion to distinguish laws from initial 
conditions. However, for the rest of this discussion, we will suppose that such distinction is 
possible. This said, let us continue our main line of thought.

	 There are two possible ways to understand the transition between nomological regimes in 
situation A and situation B, both situations involving the same natural properties. The first is that it 
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is a brute fact that is not explained by Armstrong’s conception of laws. If the apparent 
nomological change happens only once, this is not worrisome. However, if it is regularly 
happening, it is a problem: remember governism is a metaphysical theory supposed to explain 
natural regularities. The second is that it is the result of a kind of necessity. The change of 
nomological regime would be the result of the action of a meta-law, a law governing this 
transition, noted as N2(LA, LB), where LA and LB are the laws governing situation A and situation B 
respectively. In Armstrong’s framework, it is in virtue of LA and LB that the nomological transition is 
described by a necessitation relation. If this meta-law exhibits a different kind of necessity than 
natural laws, a meta-necessity, a difficulty follows. As mentioned above, in Armstrong’s 
framework, necessitation relations are grounded in universals. In consequence, different kinds of 
universals should be associated with different kinds of necessity. For example, natural and 
mathematical necessities seem clearly different because natural and mathematical properties are 
different. However, in the current case, the meta-laws are invoked to explain the change laws; in 
other words, the change of behaviors that are themselves explained by first order laws. These 
symmetrical roles push us towards identifying both necessities.  The alternative would be to say 6
that the two Ns, regular and meta-necessity, are Ns inasmuch as they are instances of some other 
N3, a broader notion of necessity. What this third necessity would be is not clear to us.

	 So, it seems preferable to keep only one kind of necessity. If there is only one kind of N 
then the Li in N(LA,LB) are not just symbols representing laws, they refer to universals, perhaps to 
natural properties, ‘to be a law of such and such kind’. These properties are relational properties 
between basic natural properties. It is not clear to us how the domain of such properties could be 
defined and if they could still be called natural properties. Indeed, it is difficult to see how two 
different dynamical laws would or would not be in the same kind.  
7
	 One of the ways to sustain such a position would be to weaken the notion of natural 
necessity. N would denote a contextual necessity. This seems to us costly, because a weak 
notion of necessity would drastically diminish the explanatory power of the governist account of 
natural laws and potentially would bring the many necessities puzzle back. The other possibility 
would be to weaken the universals. We could argue that LA and LB are not different universals 
associated with different nomological relations among the same universals. Rather, they are 
 A similar argument can be found in Yudell (2013).6
 Principles of symmetries when understood as meta-laws raise a similar difficulty.7
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referring to changes among quasi-universals and therefore they are not genuine natural laws, but 
are contextual laws. This is not because they involve different necessities, but rather, because 
they involve quasi-universals. The potential genuine laws are the ones that relate the universals to 
which the quasi-universals refer.

	 But are quasi-universals even making sense in the governist approach? According to 
Armstrong, quasi-universals ‘resemble universals permitting a multitude of instances, but unlike 
universals proper, they involve temporal or spatial restrictions’ (Armstrong 1983, 77). Two kinds of 
situation are envisioned by Armstrong: (1) laws that differ depending on location (Smith’s garden 
laws) and (2) laws that evolve through time (nomological epochs). As mentioned above, the first 
kind is not what we need for dynamical change of laws. As for the second kind, it seems 
appropriate to model global change but not local change. To go back to the above example about 
organic systems, what would be needed is a broader contextual notion of quasi-universal, e.g., 
physical properties involved in organic structures vs. physical properties involved in inorganic 
systems. To our knowledge, such a notion of indexical universals does not exist in the literature. 
The best, but limited attempt, to develop such a theory of indexical universals is in Maudlin (2007, 
chapter 3) and it is only a sketch. Let us be crystal clear about the cost. The development of a 
new theory of universals, an obviously difficult task, is a condition to produce a coherent 
conception of natural laws in this metaphysical framework. But what about the second 
possibility? We will show below that it will not simplify our problem.

	 1.2. A System Changing Properties

	 To capture the paradigmatic case of the second possibility of changing laws, let us 
imagine a system governed by the law LA and, at a later time, governed by the law LB, with LA ≠ 
LB. Note that contrary to the previous section, it is not the same set of properties that are 
instantiated in situation A and situation B. Could this process be a genuine change of laws? Note 
that this case seems more compatible with the local conception, but it could be global if the 
system in question is the entire universe at some time. If the process involves a modification of 
the identity of the system, to the point where we could not say that the system governed by LA is 
the same as the one governed by LB, then it seems hopeless to defend the position that we face a 
nomological change. It is a case analogical to the fact that different systems could be governed 
by different laws. Let us explore this further.
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	 On the other hand, if we have reasons to believe that the two situations concern the same 
system, we cannot dismiss immediately this case. Since situations A and B do not share as a 
hypothesis relevant properties, on what ground could we establish the system identity? If the 
identity of an entity depends upon the laws it obeys, as Newton argued (Brading 2013), this path 
is closed. In order to claim a continuity of the system identity, we need to disentangle between 
what it means to be such and such system and what it means to be a subject of a law.

	 A natural way to show that situation A and situation B are possibly about the same system 
is to argue that they are causally related, in an ontological fashion, and that this relation is solely, 
or at least mainly, responsible for the change of laws. Indeed, in this context, we would have 
reason to say that we are talking about the same system even if it instantiates different properties. 
Unfortunately, in the governist approach, a causal relation among particulars is generally 
understood as the result of the instantiation of a law. We would have to sustain that this 
nomological reduction of causality is only partial; that some causal links are not captured by 
normal laws, but by other kinds of causal necessity. As we have seen above, this multiplication of 
necessities is costly in the context of governism. Nevertheless, there are other means by which to 
establish a continuity of identity through property change: essence, bare individuality…but they all 
diminish significantly the elegant simplicity of the governist position. Moreover, even if we manage 
to develop such a position, we do not see how a skeptic could not simply assert that in this 
process laws did not change, only systems did.

	 In conclusion, we believe that we have shown that it is possible to allow changes of laws 
in the context of governism. However, this is not without a cost. The apparently cheapest option 
would be to develop the theory of natural laws in a framework where universals are indexical.

	 2. Changing Laws in Dispositionalism 
Dispositionalism has in recent years most commonly been developed within the 
framework of dispositional essentialism, a position with the consequence that the manifestations 
of a disposition cannot, as a matter of metaphysical necessity, fail to appear when the appropriate 
stimulus conditions for the disposition are present. As a result, if a law is rooted in such 
dispositions, that law cannot be contingent.  Although the contingent status of a law does not 8
 More specifically, there are no worlds in which the dispositional property and its stimulus exist and co-8
occurrences of instances of them are not accompanied by an instance of the manifestation property. The following 
discussion does not depend on whether the relevant properties exist in all possible worlds or only in some worlds.
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entail that it can change over time, the argument given here removes a major obstacle to the 
possibility of changing laws. There are multiple variants of dispositional essentialism but we shall 
here take Bird (2007) as representative of the spirit of the dispositional essentialist approach to 
laws. We also restrict ourselves to fundamental laws and properties.

	 2.1. Ontology 
Definition. A property D is dispositional just in case D would manifest characteristic 	 	
	 properties when characteristic stimulus properties are present, and D is also present at 		
	 times when those stimulus conditions are absent. The property is therefore  identical 	 	
	 neither with its manifestations nor with its stimulus conditions. 
9
	 A dispositional property has the generic form D(a,S,M), where a is a region of spacetime at 
which S is instantiated, S is a collection of stimulus properties, and M is a collection of 
manifestation properties. D(a,S,M) is read as “a has the disposition to manifest M when conditions 
S are present”. The detailed nature of D is abstracted from here to allow for a variety of views 
about the form of dispositions. The generic form is intended to capture causal or noncausal 
relations between the properties as well as the case where dispositional properties produce other 
dispositional properties. Those who prefer to deal in property instances can quantify over objects 
and times in the generic form. To avoid question-begging, D(a,S,M) is not assumed to have a 
particular degree of modal strength, although at this point the possibility is left open that it might 
be metaphysical necessitation. For simplicity, the analysis is restricted to deterministic laws, so 
that  the quantitative case D is such that for any given values of the determining properties S, 
there are unique values of the determined properties M. 
The standard contrast to dispositional properties is categorical properties but that contrast 
is neither uniformly drawn nor entirely neutral with respect to the goals in this paper. For example, 
Bird (2007, 3) holds that fundamental categorical properties are those whose natures are picked 
out by quiddities  and for which there are no necessary connections with other entities (op. cit. 
2007, 67). This dichotomy between categorical and dispositional properties is an uncomfortable 
 Tugby (2013) argues that not all dispositional properties need have stimulus conditions. We set aside such cases 9
here.
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fit in the present context because fundamental laws may contain mixtures of dispositional and 
categorical properties. We shall therefore not appeal to that contrast here. 
2.2. Quantitative Laws 
Dispositional essentialism is the position that the identity conditions for a dispositional 
property result from an essence that the disposition possesses, where E is an essence of 
property P just in case necessarily, if property Q lacks E, then Q ≠ P. The essence of the 
dispositional property fragility, for example, is to produce a shattering when striking is present.  
There are grades of commitment to dispositional essentialism. The strongest grade of 
commitment, dispositional monism, held by Alexander Bird (2007, Chapter 2) and Sidney 
Shoemaker (1980), is that all properties, in the case of Bird all fundamental properties, have 
dispositional essences. We shall address that grade of commitment because it leads to the 
position that if fundamental laws are patterns that result from the  manifestation of 
fundamental dispositional properties, then all fundamental laws are metaphysically necessary.

Can laws change over time under this view?  We shall first argue that although some 
fundamental qualitative laws may be metaphysically necessary, at least some fundamental 
quantitative laws are not. Having shown that laws can change across possible worlds, we 
then go on to argue that laws may be temporally limited in a way similar to laws with limited 
spatial scope.  

Dispositional essentialism holds that the fundamental properties have dispositions that 
are essential to that property, that is   (P(a) → D(a,S,M)). For, at least with respect to 
fundamental properties, those properties are individuated by their dispositional attributes and 
if the fundamental property failed to manifest its characteristic dispositional behavior it could 
not be the property it is held to be. If a putative positive charge P(a), when placed near a 
second positive charge S(b), did not produce the characteristic manifestation of  being 
repelled by the field produced by S(b) when no other forces were present  on a, the attribution 
to a of being positively charged would be incorrect. There thus cannot be a case in which the 
juxtaposition of two positive charges is not followed by their repelling one another, where the 
“cannot” is metaphysical necessitation.

Let us grant for the moment that the sentence “Positive charges repel other positive 
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charges” is a metaphysically necessary truth on the grounds that anything that does not repel 
a positive charge ipso facto does not itself possess the property of being positively charged. 
But scientific laws, at least in physics, go beyond simple qualitative relations such as “Like 
charges repel one another”. They involve quantitative relations and have a specific 
mathematical form. Here is a simple hypothetical example. Suppose that Hooke’s Law is a 
fundamental law of world W. There are various versions of Hooke’s Law; here we are taking 
the phenomenological version that states ‘The extension of a spring or wire is directly 
proportional to the force applied’. The fundamental properties in W are of three kinds: the 
property of being a wire, the property of having a spatial extension, and the property of being 
a force.   Wires in W are noncomposite objects, not being made up of more fundamental 10
entities, and it is important that we can identify  them in terms of features other than Hooke’s 
Law. One way to do this is to identify them using the properties of being thin, being 
cylindrical, and being metal.  This characterization still allows the property of being a wire to 
have a qualitative dispositional essence, in that the property of being a wire entails a 
qualitative disposition to extend when a force is applied along the direction of the wire. It is 
not a quantitative disposition characterized by Hooke’s Law. On this basis, let us allow that, 
analogously to the qualitative form of Coulomb’s Law, the qualitative law ‘Wires extend when 
a longitudinal force is applied’ is metaphysically necessary.  However, this qualitative  truth 11
does not give us the mathematical form of the relation between the extension of the wire and 
the applied force. We can now consider a quantitative dispositional property possessed by 
wires, which is a disposition to extend by f(x) under the application of a force F.  In world W, 
the relation is linear and fundamental, where a fundamental relation is one for which there is 
no explanation. Thus, in W, F = kx for the force needed to extend by x a wire with modulus of 
elasticity k.  Call this law L. 12
Suppose that in a second world, W*, F = k*x, where k≠k*. Do we have the same law 
with a different coefficient or a different law? On a very strict interpretation of essentialism, 
one’s inclination might be to argue that this is a different law because the dependent variable 
 To keep the prose simple, we shall from now on refer to ‘wires’ as shorthand for the instantiation of the property of 10
being a wire.
 We are  not endorsing this claim of metaphysical necessity, but allowing it for purposes of argument.11
 In world W, the modulus of elasticity for a given material is a fundamental constant. It is not the result of the 12
internal composition of the material.
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changes by a different amount with a unit increase in the independent variable and so the wire 
in W* follows a different regularity than it does in W. But that inclination is not conclusive, for 
within our own world, we hold that wires with different values of the modulus of elasticity 
follow the same law, Hooke’s Law, just with different coefficients. This response can be 
justified by noting that the values of k are not elements of a law but contextual elements, akin 
to initial conditions, and so are not responsible for changes in laws.  So take a third world 13
W** with the same fundamental entities where f is quadratic and fundamental so that the form 
of the law is F = -kx2. Call that law L**. L** should be considered to be a different law from L 
because it has a different mathematical form, nonlinear as opposed to linear. This example is 
no longer about a change in a fundamental constant but about a change in the mathematical 
form of the law.

A determined defender of the metaphysical necessity of laws might maintain that in 
both W and in W** wires obey the same polynomial law, only with different degrees of the 
polynomial. But unless the defender of metaphysical necessity is willing to argue that all 
mathematical functions have a single underlying form, we can always find some other W+ in 
which wires follow a different mathematical regularity. In both  W and W+, the wire has a 
disposition to require a force f(x) when stretched by x but the law covering that force has 
changed between W and W+. Hooke’s Law, the quantitative law that holds in our world, is not 
essential to that disposition because wires, forces on wires and extensions of wires have 
identity conditions that are independent of Hooke’s Law as given above. It is therefore not 
essential to wires that they conform to Hooke’s Law across worlds. Again, a determined 
essentialist could maintain that the quantitative form of the law is essential to the disposition, 
but as Fine (2002) has noted, this is at odds with how we assess possibilities. Thus at least 
some fundamental laws are not metaphysically necessary. 

Some earlier authors have argued for related conclusions. Hendry and Rowbottom 
(2009) argue for the contingency of natural laws but restrict themselves to small changes in 
the form of the law. Keinänen (2014) uses a trope and causal process ontology to argue for 
slight changes in the functional form of laws or changes in natural constants. In contrast, the 
argument given here allows for significant changes in the mathematical form of fundamental 
 Bird (2007, 212-213) argues that historical evidence suggest that we can eventually explain why fundamental 13
constants have the values that they do. In the example given here, however, it is a feature of W* that k* is 
fundamental. See also Lowe (2002).
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laws. Bird (2007, 48-49) on the other hand argues that all fundamental laws are 
metaphysically necessary on the grounds that a true account of fundamental laws should be 
unified. This is to impose a metaphysical tidyness principle on a world that may be 
fundamentally messy, a position that concedes too much to the best system account. It may 
be objected that dispositional essentialism asserts only that at least one property of a 
disposition is essential. We can accept that point and note that because the argument 
involving the mathematical form of laws generalizes widely, and most laws in fundamental 
sciences have a mathematical form, dispositional essentialism is probably confined to cases 
involving qualitative laws. That number is arguably non-zero, because the basic “Like charges 
repel” form of Coulomb’s Law looks amenable to dispositional essentialism. This is because a 
central feature of the argument just given is that one can, and often does, qualitatively identify 
the properties involved in a law before the mathematical form of the law is discovered.  What 14
of the inverse square law that accompanies Coulomb’s Law? Here symmetry considerations 
that underlie many inverse square forms when a geometrically homogeneous field is involved 
can be cited in favor of essentialism, but, along the lines of the point made earlier, this will be 
a required feature of a world only under a stipulative simplicity condition requiring 
homogeneity.

	 	 2.3 Temporal Changes in Laws. 
To facilitate a transition between the contingency of laws and changes of laws over 
time, two kinds of necessity can be considered. In the first type of necessity, the contingent 
nomological necessity attached to laws of nature is reduced to a specification of at which 
other possible worlds the regularity associated with the law occurs, the number of such 
worlds lying between the full complement of worlds associated with metaphysical necessity 
and the much smaller number of worlds at which accidental occurrences of the regularity are 
present. This can be called the external account of necessity because the criteria for its 
presence involve worlds external to our own.  In contrast, the internal account of necessity 15
involves a relation of necessitation within our world. Its canonical example is that of a non-
 The situation is complicated by the fact that Coulomb’s Law is often considered not to be a fundamental law but 14
a consequence of the more general Gauss’s Law.
 In the possible worlds approach it seems to be an implicit assumption that the laws of a given world are fixed, 15
although it would be easy to adapt the approach to relax that assumption.
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Humean causal necessitation in which a cause necessitates the occurrence of its effect. To 
put the distinction starkly: even if there were no other possible worlds, the internal necessity 
would still exist. This distinction is difficult to make within the dominant possible worlds 
approach to modalities and indeed it is common to hold that any metaphysically necessary 
proposition is also nomologically necessary (Shoemaker 1980, Fales 1993, Bird 2004). 
Drawing this distinction may seem odd to many readers but assimilating nomological 
necessity within the broader category of metaphysical necessity blurs an important 
distinction. What is central to nomological necessitation (rather than nomological necessity) is 
what brings about the occurrence of the nomologically necessitated event or state. Nothing 
brings about a metaphysically necessary proposition (or state) and so incorporating the 
nomological cases within the metaphysical case is inappropriate unless one is already 
committed to a Humean view within which no event brings about another event.

Tahko (2015, 520-521) explores the question of whether the possibility of laws 
changing over time sheds light on the possibility of them changing across possible worlds. A 
central example he considers is the possibility of the fine structure constant changing over 
time.  Because the fine structure constant is defined in terms of other fundamental 16
constants, so that a change in the former would require a change in at least one of the latter, 
laws in which one or more of those constants occur are possibilities for changing laws.   In 17
the other direction, what would the contingency of some fundamental laws say about the 
possibility of a law changing over time? Recall that Hooke’s Law is a linear approximation to 
the actual behavior of wires, but one that is a good approximation over a specifiable interval 
of elongation. Call the actual law in that spatial interval LI. We also know that a wire is still a 
wire in a larger spatial interval where the law takes on some nonlinear functional form LI* (and 
before the wire deforms beyond the point where a restorative force is present.) Despite the 
standard restriction that laws should be universal, there are often scope restrictions on the 
quantifiers regarding constraints on the domain of application of the law. Here there is a broad 
scope limitation to the region of elasticity and a tighter scope restriction to whatever the 
contingent limits of extension are within which Hooke’s Law holds. If we allow such 
 Takho’s paper also arrives at the conclusion that there are some metaphysically necessary laws and some 16
metaphysically contingent laws, but using an ontology of fundamental natural kinds to argue for that conclusion.
 As of now, the evidence for temporal or spatial variations in the fine structure constant is inconclusive.17
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restrictions on the scope of a law, why not permit temporal restrictions? We do not have at 
present a definitive answer to that question, but one way to approach it is to take the fact that 
in early epochs of the universe, decreases in temperature act as a surrogate for intervals of 
time. The question then becomes why restricting a fundamental law to certain regions of 
temperature is inadmissible. The standard response to that question is to invoke a unification 
principle, but absent a convincing metaphysical argument that the nomological structure of 
the universe must be simple, unification is merely a methodological principle that leaves open 
the possibility of temporally restricted laws.

3. Changing Laws in Humeanism 
	 In the present section, we turn to Humean regularity theories about laws, which, contrary 
to the views discussed above, eschew any commitment to natural necessity. In particular, we 
discuss the extent to which Lewis-style ‘best system analysis’ could be amended in order to leave 
room for changing laws.

	 3.1. Stage Setting

	 Humeanism can be defined through the conjunction of two claims: (a) truth supervenes on 
being and (b) there are no necessary connections between distinct existents. The so-called 
‘Humean Mosaic’ (hereafter HM; Lewis 1986, p.ix-x) allows for having a grasp on what exactly 
‘being’ or ‘existents’ refer to: the world just is an arrangement of local, particular facts (typically 
space-time points having intrinsic qualities and related to one another by spatio-temporal 
relations). It is also a typical feature of Humeanism that existents that are not themselves part of 
HM nonetheless supervene on it, to the effect that everything that is not itself an arrangement of 
qualities only exists in virtue of some of HM’s arrangements of qualities.

	 Given its rejection of necessary connections, Humeanism is very hospitable to regularity 
accounts of laws. The most sophisticated variant of these currently is the Mill-Ramsey-Lewis or 
Best System Account (hereafter BSA), according to which laws are those worldly regularities that 
are captured by the axioms and theorems of the true deductive system that best systematizes the 
world. Typically, a given system’s degree of success in systematizing the world is dependent on a 
balance between the system’s strength (the amount of information it gives about the world), 
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simplicity (the syntactical complexity/number of its axioms) and fit (a measure of the likelihood of 
the world being as the system tells it is).

	 As they are not the kinds of things that directly belong to HM, BS-laws can only be said to 
exist insofar as they supervene on HM, giving sense to the idea that, with respect to the BSA, the 
laws do not fix—nor do they govern, necessitate or bring about—the facts. Rather, they are what 
they are in virtue of some set S of facts of HM. The exact nature of S is of course partly the topic 
of the present section. Typically—but, as we would like to claim in what follows, not necessarily—
S is taken to be the whole of HM, comprising past, present and future facts throughout space. As 
it appears, the BSA is a reductive account of some sort: laws of nature reduce to a given set of 
non-nomic facts.

	 In order to allow for a comparison between the degrees of success of different deductive 
systems in systematizing our world, it proves necessary for these systems to be expressed into a 
unique language, which picks out those properties that happen to ‘carve nature at its joints’. Such 
properties, deemed ‘perfectly natural’ (hereafter PN; Lewis 1983; 1986), are of a sparse and elite 
kind. They are the ones whose instantiations form the bedrock ontology of Humeanism—the very 
‘tiles’ of HM—so that they constitute the ultimate supervenience basis for all the other, non-PN 
properties. Though the very distinction between PN and non-PN properties is to be taken as 
primitive, PN properties are the ones which ultimately figure into the laws, and it is up to science 
to tell us—always only tentatively to be sure—which are the PN properties of our world.

	 Typically, mainstream Humeanism has the following features: 
18
(i) Fundamentalism: PN properties form a unique set of properties whose instantiations constitute 
the bedrock ontology of a Humean world, viz. HM (Lewis 1994a). From such a bedrock, other, 
derivative existents obtain through supervenience. Fundamental laws of nature, as axioms of the 
best system, only refer to PN properties.

(ii) Physicalism: PN properties are physical and should therefore be identifiable as such by (the 
final) physics (Lewis 1994a).

 We could have added realism to the list, insofar as, primarily, BS-laws are supposed to be things in the world, namely 18
regularities or patterns among facts of HM. It is only secondarily that they are captured by formal devices that allow for 
organizing knowledge of the world (Earman 1984; Ramsey’s epistemological version of the BSA is perhaps a notable 
exception to this).
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(iii) (Mereological) reductionism: Non-PN properties reduce to PN properties. Such a reductionism 
immediately follows from a strong interpretation of supervenience (Lewis 1994b), to the effect that 
emergent properties are ipso facto to be excluded (Lewis 1986). 
19
(iv) Eternalism: Past, present and future facts are ontologically on a par, to the effect that there is 
no genuine becoming in typical Humean worlds. This usually translates as considering HM as the 
block universe (Friebe 2018).

(v) Optimism: In some way, ‘nature is kind to us’, to the effect that there is only one deductive 
system that comes out best of the competition for lawhood (Lewis 1994a). Such an assumption is 
the Humean surrogate for Armstrong- or Ellis-style timeless necessary connections for the 
purpose of mitigating the skeptical problem of induction (Beebee 2011).

Though crucial, feature (v) is, as such, obviously very vague. The typical way to make it 
precise is to translate it into a commitment about the putative universality of BS-laws, as follows:

(v*) Universalism: BS-laws hold everywhere and everywhen. They are regularities that span—or 
their supervenience basis S is—the whole of HM. This precludes them from having exceptions 
(Lewis 1986; or Swartz 2003, chapter 9).

	 Together with the defining ideas (a) and (b) of Humeanism, features (i)-(v*) delineate the 
canonical, Lewis-style BSA package. Heterodox versions of the account have recently flourished, 
which cast doubt upon the necessity—or even the very soundness—of some of these features. 
Though they all converge on rejecting (v*), ‘Better Best System Accounts’ challenge (i)-(iii), in the 
spirit of a non-fundamentalist, non-physicalist and antireductionist version of the BSA (Schrenk 
2008; Cohen & Callender 2009), whereas varieties of ‘open-future Humeanism’ tend rather to put 
(iv) into question (Backmann 2016; Smart 2018).

 This is true with respect to traditional, synchronic emergence. Humeanism is actually more tolerant with diachronic 19
emergence (Sartenaer 2019).
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	 In a more conservative spirit, we would like to question here the necessity of building (v∗) 
into the BSA without having to go as far as to give up on any of the claims (i)-(v). To be sure that 
BS-laws are universal (that is, omnispatial and omnitemporal) is a powerful intuition that is prima 
facie well-motivated. It appears indeed that the wider the spatial and temporal extension of laws 
is, the more probable it is that they score high in strength at a low cost to simplicity. After all, best 
systems presumably are the ones with few but powerful axioms. Though sound, such a 
motivation should nonetheless not lead us to consider (v∗) as a sine qua non condition for BS-
lawhood (Earman 1978). As we show below, it could well be that general statements with some 
restricted scope—or general statements supervening on a set of facts S smaller than the whole of 
HM—turn out to be powerful and simple enough (in comparison with more general statements) for 
finding their way into the best system.

	 3.2. Against (v*): BS-Laws Can Change

	 In this section, we show that there are ways in which (v*) breaks down that nonetheless 
allow for the competition between deductive systems to designate a unique, best system of laws, 
provided that nature remains, to some extent, kind to us. Two of these ways correspond to 
scenarios where BS-laws admit few, local violations, and where BS-laws change in a particular 
way. But beforehand, a preliminary definition:

A given world is (BS-)law-based as soon as, at the end of time, it is possible to 	 	 	
	 unambiguously designate a unique best system (insofar as such a system strikes the best 	
	 balance, by far, between simplicity, strength and fit).

	 Let us first consider a world W that is an infinitely extended Euclidean space-time 
containing n massive point-like particles. Together with a specification of the particles’ masses, 
positions and velocities at any given time, the particles’ trajectories can be fully recovered from a 
unique general statement L (say, in a Newtonian spirit, F=Gmm’r-2u). Surely, W is law-based. A 
competition run against all the deductive systems that are true to W, and which only pick out its 
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PN properties (here mass), is going to unambiguously designate a unique best system, namely {Ft, 
L}, with Ft being a factual statement about the physical state of W at t. 
20
	 Now consider a set of worlds Wn, which are similar to W except from the fact that, in n 
infinitesimal portions of spacetime, L fails to be true. Recent works in the Humean tradition tend 
to indicate that, in spite of the existence of such ‘violations’ of L, worlds like this can happen to be 
law-based provided that, among other things, n is small. ‘Lossy laws’ are indeed not to be 
excluded a priori from the BSA, notably because the sheer amount of informativeness they carry 
with them is not always outbalanced by the drop in simplicity that any ceteris paribus clause 
inexorably induces in a deductive system (Braddon-Mitchell 2001; Schrenk 2014).  This is 21
certainly true, for instance, for world W1, where only one local ‘violation’ of L is supposed to 
occur; its best system therefore being {Ft, S1, L}, where S1 is a statement about the domain of 
validity of L or the portion of W1’s HM on which L supervenes (being the whole of HM minus the 
only infinitesimal ‘exception’). It is notable that, already in W1, L is not universal, although it is 
invariant in its own domain, in a way that is respectful of the regularist spirit of the BSA. As it 
appears, the very fact that there exist portions of a world’s HM that its laws fail to systematize is 
not necessarily enough for depriving these laws from being the best handles for systematizing 
knowledge about this world.

	 Let us now turn to worlds in which n takes on an infinite value, that is, worlds in which L 
has an infinite amount of ‘violations’. With respect to such worlds, two distinct cases are worth 
considering. First, L’s violations could be scattered randomly and discretely throughout space-
time. In such dramatically ‘unkind’ situations, it is plausible that adding a ceteris paribus clause to 
L for each of its ‘violations’ will add too much complexity for it to deserve its entry into the best 
system. It is even plausible that the corresponding worlds would fail to be law-based at all. 
Secondly and by contrast, it could also be that L’s violations are themselves regular, so that they 
 When t is set up at the origin of W, Ft captures W’s initial conditions. As it appears, we are inclined to stick to Lewis’ 20
letter here, by (i) allowing for factual statements to figure into the best system—for they certainly provide the system 
with a boost in strength against a not too drastic sacrifice in simplicity—and (ii) not considering these statements as 
lawful (Lewis 1983, p.367). Recent Lewisian thinkers are prone to accept (i) but deny (ii), that is, they consider 
statements of facts about a world’s initial conditions as worthy of figuring in the best system while being themselves 
lawful (Albert 2000; Loewer 2012). Though it is a matter of possible controversy that the BSA actually has the resources 
to draw a distinction between laws and boundary conditions (Hicks 2018), this will not keep us busy any further here. It 
should also be noted that the virtue of fit is left aside in the present discussion as the worlds at stake are deterministic.
 At some point, Lewis himself seemed to have endorsed such a view in spite of the supposed universality of BS-laws 21
(Lewis 1973, p.75).
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can be expressed through a highly compressed shortcut that itself deserves its entry into the best 
system. A case like this would be a world Wc where L is true everywhere up to time tc, after which 
L* (say F=-Gmm’r-2u) becomes true. Using a canonical metaphor, in order to give scientists 
knowledge about such a world, God would not need to give them L and an infinite compendium 
of all its ‘violations’, nor would She need to provide L* and an infinite compendium of all its 
‘violations’, for L and L* would themselves be informationally redundant with these compendia. All 
that would be needed is—that is, Wc’s best system would be—{Ft, S, S*, L, L*}, where the factual 
information about the ‘turning point’ between L and L*’s regimes is contained within the 
specification of their supervenience bases S and S*.

	 The main morale of this discussion is this: if ceteris paribus laws can be Humeanly kosher, 
so can changing laws. The situation in which both kinds of law happen to figure in a world’s best 
system is the same: the complexity that is added by the factual statements necessary to pin 
down the laws’ domains of validity (or supervenience basis) must be outbalanced by the 
informativeness of these laws. Though for some worlds it can be impossible to figure out whether 
such a situation is actually the case, in relatively kind worlds, such as W1 and Wc where 
information about the laws’ ‘violations’ is either very limited or highly compressible, e.g., for it is 
itself in accordance with a law, non-universal, yet-invariant-in-their-domain laws deserve their 
entry into the best systematization of the world.

	 3.3. Changing Laws and HM’s Nomological Structure

	 As it appears, in order for BS-laws to change in a given world, the world’s HM has to 
possess some primitive structure—let us call it the ‘nomological structure’—in the sense that it 
has to be chopped into spatiotemporally distinct regions, each of which is made of a different 
pattern of instantiations of PN properties and amenable to its own separate best system analysis 
(leading to a different system of laws).  That a world’s Humean mosaic possesses such a 22
nomological structure is ultimately apparent in its overall best system, as encoded into the distinct 
domains of validity Si of its laws Li. It could even be that, from an epistemological point of view, it 
 Although in the example of world Wc the nomological structure is purely temporal, it could well be (rather or also) 22
spatial.
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is only through a world’s overall best system that we can come to know what that world’s 
nomological structure happens to be.

	 Of course, one could be reluctant to build some hidden structure into HM, insofar as, 
prima facie, doing so tends to conflict with the typical ontological sobriety of Humeanism. 
However, it is already the case in mainstream, Lewisian Humeanism that the very nature of a 
world’s HM is in itself brute and primitive (as well as contingent, although what natural properties 
there are is supposed to hold with metaphysical necessity). ‘If one is a Humean, then the Humean 
Mosaic itself appears to admit of no further explanation’ (Maudlin 2007, p.172). Accordingly, 
unless primitiveness happens to be a matter of degree—which we think it is not—a Humean 
mosaic with an intricate nomological structure is not more mysterious or unanalyzable that a 
Humean mosaic with the most degenerate nomological structure there is, viz. a unique domain—
actually the whole of HM—that is the supervenience basis for all the (then immutable) laws of 
nature.

	 In light of this, here is a definition: a law L is a changing BS-law of world W iff:

(i) L is a BS-law of W, that is, it appears in the (non-factual part of) its best system, 
and 

(ii) L is changing, that is, there is at least one best sub-system of W in which a 
surrogate L* of L appears in place of L.

By a ‘surrogate’ law L*, we mean a law that systematizes—or a worldly regularity among—
instances of the very same PN properties as L, and which cannot be subsumed under L (for 
example, in world Wc, both L and L* describe distinct ways in which instances of mass are 
patterned across HM).

	 Accordingly, a changing law L is a law that is neither universal nor merely ceteris paribus (it 
is only ‘violated’ in a way that is itself BS-lawful). In a world W containing a changing law L, there 
is always at least one region S of HM in which L is a law—insofar as L is a particularly efficient 
handle to systematize knowledge about S—and one region S* in which L is not a law, to the effect 
that there is a surrogate L* of L that turns out to be a better handle than L for systematizing 
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knowledge about S*. Ultimately, that L is a law in S but not in S* is dependent on the way in which 
the instances of the PN properties are patterned, as it should be .
23
	 Conclusion

	 In this paper, we aimed at answering the question—with respect to three of the most 
widespread theories of laws of nature available—what price changing laws of nature? 

	 In section 1, which was devoted to Armstrong’s necessitarianism, we argued that the most 
cost-effective way of accommodating changing laws was to weaken the very notion of a 
universal. In particular, we have shown that changing laws could fall squarely within such a 
governist framework as soon as one is ready to build spatial or temporal restrictions into the 
universals themselves, in the spirit of Armstrong’s own concept of quasi-universal. Though open, 
such an option would nonetheless need to be fully fleshed out, notably by devising a (currently 
non-existing) theory of indexical universals.  

	 We then provided an argument in section 2 to the effect that dispositionalism should not 
necessarily be tied to essentialism, by showing that some properties can happen to be identified 
through criteria that are independent from the manifestations of their dispositions. Incidentally, 
this entailed that properties can well be identified without any explicit reference to the laws 
covering the possible manifestations of their dispositions (and, a fortiori, to these laws’ exact 
mathematical form). Such an observation opens the door for a nonessentialist version of 
dispositionalism which allows for (at least some) dispositions to change over time (and, with them, 
the laws).  

	 Finally, in section 3, we turned to Humeanism and Lewis’ ‘best system’ take on laws of 
nature. We argued that the only reason why best system laws could be seen as immutable is 
because the supervenience basis of all these laws has been set up ‘by hand’ to the whole spatio-
temporal extension of the Humean mosaic (in the spirit of making sure that nomic regularities are 
 It has recently been suggested that one way of breaking free of the immutability of BS-laws is to embrace a growing 23
block universe ontology (see for instance Backmann’s (2016) ‘open-future Humeanism’ or Smart’s (2018) 
‘hypertemporal Humeanism’). Even more, the resulting account of changing BS-laws would be ‘true[r] to Hume’ (Smart 
2018, p.109). Though we are of course sympathetic to these endeavors, we also think that their commitment to a 
growing block universe ontology is (i) risky—for the combination of the view with Humeanism is notoriously unstable 
(Hüttemann 2014; Briggs & Forbes 2017)—and, more importantly perhaps, (ii) unnecessary for the sole sake of securing 
the laws’ mutability. As we have seen, it is indeed enough for BS-laws to change that there are adjacent regions of HM 
(as a block universe) in which the laws differ (especially when the relation of adjacency can be purely temporal, as in the 
case of Wc). As such, it appears an unnecessary metaphysical inflation to consider that changing BS-laws must also 
pop into existence at a certain turning point in time. 
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robust enough for our world to be law-based). Removing such an undue restriction allowed the 
relaxation of the account in order for it to accommodate ceteris paribus as well as changing laws, 
without having to tamper with its core defining features. 

	 As it appears, necessitarianism, dispositionalism and Humeanism do not cope in the same 
way with the possibility of changing laws. While the latter only needs superficial adjustments that 
would not be considered as too heterodox by its own proponents, both necessitarianism and 
dispositionalism have to make some bigger concessions. It remains to be seen whether or not 
this would count as a flaw, depending on whether or not the very idea of laws changing appears 
to gain plausibility over the years.
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